Real outages. Collect the lesson.

Real outages from public postmortems: what broke, why, and what the team changed. No blame. Could've been any of us.

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  1. #7 · BinanceDown ~2 days No key was stolen. $6.3 billion still left. WTF: Everyone guards the private keys. Here, by every account so far, the keys stayed safe. The weak point was the system allowed to use them. If a system can sign, then whoever can talk to that system can sign too. And the outage came after the theft. Turning withdrawals back on safely took longer than the theft itself: about 20 minutes to take the money, about two days to let people move theirs again. Preliminary
  2. #8 · GitHubDown 19 min The pause was on. The automation kept going. WTF: The team did the right thing after the first outage. They found the bad machine and pressed pause on the automation. The automation had stopped listening to pause after a recent update, so it brought the same machine back, and the same outage happened 96 minutes later.
  3. #9 · RailwayDown ~2 days The attacker called endpoints nobody had used in years WTF: Railway first learned the attacker had its source code from the endpoints they probed: ones that had not been used for weeks, months or even years, with no live references left in the system. Nobody calls those. Unless they are reading your code.
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#9 · RailwayDown ~2 days The attacker called endpoints nobody had used in years Outage on20 Oct 2026 Who it hitRailway, builds, deploys and stored environment variables To the Railway team: thank you for a long, detailed report on a hard week, including the parts that don't look good, like the OIDC binding and why customers heard later than the providers.

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